U.S. Treasury

Congress tried late last week to stall the financial crisis by pledging to spend $700 billion on devalued securities held by financial institutions, and by Monday morning, it was clear that the pledge wasn’t enough to reassure investors or restart lending.

Instead, a classic panic has set in here and around much of the world as public confidence in banks, other financial institutions and the markets themselves has nosedived; at the same time, banks and other financial institutions are wary of loaning money to potential borrowers. This panicked mindset threatens the economy more today than the continuing turmoil in the housing and financial markets. 

We must now recreate baseline confidence before we can repair the continuing damage to our financial and housing markets.  

Financial and broader economic panics thrive on a combination of huge and unexpected setbacks and a serious absence of information. They unfold when people face enormous uncertainty about matters vital to them, such as the value and security of their homes,  retirement accounts and college savings. Panics thrive when people see everyone else, including those with the power and position to manage such weighty matters, struggling with the same uncertainty. 

People feel threatened and powerless to do anything, not because they have no options, but because they have to evaluate or choose among those options, and they worry that more unexpected calamities could overtake whatever course they decide upon. That’s where tens of millions of Americans – and Europeans and Asians as well – have found themselves this week. They don’t understand why the value of their homes and investments has plummeted so suddenly, and they see that those ostensibly in charge of the economy in Washington and on Wall Street have little grip on this as well. The result is that spending and investment are shutting down, dragging the entire economy into what seems very likely to be the worst downturn since the 1930s. 

The remedy to this panic is information, which only the nation’s leaders can generate and demonstrate they understand. For example, the Federal Reserve and the FDIC should have legions of examiners working around the clock to re-audit the conditions of all major financial institutions, starting with commercial banks. The Treasury and Fed could then report to the public on each institution’s financial health and their confidence in its continuing financial health. The largest group would still be judged healthy; another group could be designated as worth watching, with measures to help it move to the first group; those in trouble would be identified with a plan of action to help them recover, if possible. Without this information, most people have been panicking that almost every institution and every investment might well be in serious trouble.  

This program won’t solve the capitalization crisis across financial institutions, much less the crisis gripping housing markets, which itself has driven so much of the current upheaval. But it would staunch the panic as investors, business owners and families come to feel that they finally know where the problems lie and what the government and nation’s business leaders will do to address them.

At the same time, our leaders can finally begin to address seriously the housing and capitalization crises in an economic environment in which businesses and people will be able respond reasonably and predictably.

Years of reckless mismanagement by the self-styled masters of the financial universe and senior economic policy officials now leave us with no alternatives but major action – but the Administration’s proposals are neither the only alternative nor anywhere close to the best one.

The Treasury says we need its plan to address a liquidity crisis, with banks unable to secure the funds to lend to sound businesses that need to invest or just need to meet their payrolls. There is evidence that overnight lending to banks by other banks or other financial institutions is way down. But there’s no evidence of sound companies unable to get funds to meet operating requirements. Moreover, the Federal Reserve has opened its "discount" window and is prepared to lend funds to any financial institution and at below-market rates. The Bush Administration seems to be trying to steamroll Congress and the public: we have to conclude that there is no liquidity emergency that could conceivably justify the steps they propose.

The Treasury also says Americans have to be prepared to bankroll their plan, because more financial institutions are on the verge of insolvency, which would trigger serious problems for the economy. The insolvency or capital problem is self-evident, since these institutions created it. They borrowed hundreds of billions of dollars to buy mortgage-backed securities and to sell the default-protecting derivatives of those securities, all of which were patently speculative: they bought and sold them precisely because they produced very large streams of monthly income, and since financial markets trade off risk and return, their initial high returns signaled that they were very risky.

Now that the securities have fallen sharply in value, these institutions owe much more on the debt they took on to buy them than the securities themselves are worth. That means capital losses that come out of their equity and leave many of them technically insolvent or close to it. So there is a real capital or equity problem across much of our financial system. The Treasury plan won’t solve it, however, not at least on terms that any sensible legislator, regulator or taxpayer should consider.

The Treasury plan originally contemplated providing that capital by paying financial institutions more than their securities are currently worth – since it’s the current market value of those securities that threatens these institutions with insolvency. So that means ordinary taxpayers would have to overpay for the assets of institutions owned and operated by the richest people in America. That’s the Bush economic doctrine, but it’s not mine – is it yours?

At a minimum, if taxpayers are to overpay rich people for their risky investments, they should get a big equity stake in all the institutions in return. That would make it a version of a debt-equity swap – but if that’s what it is, we alternatively could use regulation to require debt-equity swaps between the institutions and those they actually owe to debt to. That would be cleaner, less intrusive over the long run, and create no taxpayer exposure.

Alternatively, Congress could mandate that these institutions halt dividend payments and raise more capital, since we’re in this fix because they haven’t been subject to capital/equity requirements. Anything can find a buyer at the right price, and as a result of these institutions’ mismanagement, they’ll have to trade more of their equity for the capital -- as Goldman Sachs is doing now with Warren Buffet.

That still leaves the most serious business. Congress needs to take serious steps to address the underlying cause of the crisis by stabilizing the underlying assets: provide a new loan facility for homeowners facing foreclosure or new mechanisms to renegotiate the terms of the mortgages of people facing foreclosure. It also leaves one more thing: the stark and unhappy recognition that the Treasury, the Federal Reserve and the White House have produced an unworkable, inequitable and inefficient plan that Congress need not and should not accept.

The price of what are called “credit default swaps” for U.S. Treasury debt is rising sharply. Credit default swaps are financial instruments by which one investor holding debt pays another investor to guarantee that if that debt defaults, he will make the first investor whole. 

This week, the Treasury assumed responsibility for $5.2 trillion in outstanding debts held by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. A modest but significant share of that is headed for default, and the Treasury will have to absorb the losses. And the result is a rising price for credit default swaps on the U.S. Government: It now costs $18,000 to insure $10 million of U.S. Treasury debt. The market sees a very small - but not negligible - prospect that the U.S. Government would actually default on its debt, which would be, well, the end of the American and global economies as we know them. That’s how bad it is.

Credit default swaps for subprime mortgage based securities, of course, have played a significant role in the current unraveling in the financial markets. But conservative/Republican disdain for normal regulation of those markets has played the larger, underlying role.  Such regulation isn’t intended to “manage” those markets, but to ensure that the rest of us are protected from serious repercussions when problematic choices by financial market players (for example, to double down on subprime mortgages or their derivatives) collide with adverse conditions that make those problematic choices very reckless.

That’s the essential meaning of the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac regulatory bailouts. Setting aside the many years of astonishingly reckless and self-interested management at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the mortgage market would freeze up if these two institutions suddenly couldn’t operate. Here’s a brief course in why that’s so: there’s always plenty of credit for new mortgages, because those creating the mortgages promptly sell them, in bundles, to investors, so that the credit can cycle back to finance more mortgages. 

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac both create and buy trillions of dollars in these mortgage-backed securities, and there’s no financial institution that could step in if they were taken out of the picture. That’s why we need to keep them operating, even if it requires a bailout. By the way, the other major holders of these securities include U.S. banks – expect a line of them to go belly-up in the next six months – and foreign central banks. 

The potential unpleasant fallout for our relations with other countries if their holdings went bust is the other reason that the Bush Administration has taken the largest interventionist step in U.S. financial markets since the Great Depression. Once again, the Bush Administration is moved to act not by what’s happening to Americans, but by the implications for our relations with other countries